Every September, I attend the International Symposium on Economic Crime at Cambridge University.
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After discussions with investigators, prosecutors, bankers and compliance officers, the annual conclusion is inescapable: well-organised crime pays - perhaps even more so in 2025.

Part of the explanation is straightforward. When crime is non-violent - theft of fungible high-value items, fraud, elaborate embezzlement schemes - sentences tend to be light. Even headline cases that make international news often end with modest custodial terms and little real asset recovery.
Take, for example, the notorious Antwerp diamond heist that resulted in the loss of well over $200 million worth of precious stones. The alleged ringleader was arrested and imprisoned for six years, yet the stolen gems were never recovered.
Similarly, the more recent Inigo Philbrick art fraud in the US: Philbrick was sentenced to seven years jail and ordered to forfeit the $100 million generated by fraudulent sales, but most of the missing money has not been traced - and he served only four years of his sentence.
Why then does high-level crime pay? There are several reasons:
The first is criminals moving money to hard-to-reach places. The first stage of laundering - placing illicit proceeds into the financial system - is easier than ever.
Criminals funnel funds through banks in jurisdictions that are slow or unwilling to co-operate with foreign law enforcement, use cryptocurrencies with weak anti-money-laundering (AML) controls, or buy high-value movable goods (such as diamonds and top-end art) that are easily transported and sold.
Real estate is another favourite: purchasing property through shell companies hides ultimate ownership and converts cash into a secure, appreciating asset.
London and Queensland are examples of markets where opaque ownership has long hampered regulators. Money coming in for investment is usually seen as beneficial for the local economy and often avoids close scrutiny.
The second is a jurisdictional mismatch. Organised criminal networks are transnational, fluid, flat structures. They exploit the fact that law enforcement is ponderously hierarchical and operates within national legal frameworks.
An investigation that requires evidence from three or four countries can stall under differing evidentiary rules, complex reciprocity arrangements, and the sheer administrative burden of putting together an understandable prosecution case.
While organised criminals glide across borders, investigators and prosecutors have to climb over them.
Third is resource and legal constraints. Complex financial investigations are expensive and time-consuming.
Prosecutors must show criminal intent and trace funds through layers of transactions - a process that can take years and still fail to produce the "smoking gun" needed for a conviction. Most jurisdictions prioritise violent crime; sophisticated financial prosecutions are usually underfunded and understaffed.
Meanwhile, affluent defendants can hire the best defence counsel, forensic accountants and legal strategists.
A well-resourced defence can exploit legal technicalities, delay proceedings, and stretch investigations well beyond political or budgetary attention spans.
For the state, pursuing an expensive and complex investigation is often impractical.
Fourth is technology and evolving cyber tools. Criminals adopt new technology much faster than government agencies. Cryptocurrencies, privacy-enhancing services, anonymous shell company registries, and increasingly sophisticated cyber tools create a difficult fast-moving international target for investigators.
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The rise of AI has deepened the challenge. AI-generated frauds can be repeated, multiplied, or automated at large scale with very little extra effort or cost.
Traditionally, frauds required time and direct criminal involvement (say, forging documents, sending out letters, or making phone calls one by one). But with AI and automation, a single fraudster (or small group) can reach thousands or millions of targets at once.
With phishing emails and texts, once a template is created, it can be delivered to millions of recipients worldwide at almost no cost. In deepfake scams an AI-generated voice or video can be reused across many fraud attempts, from impersonating a CEO to tricking employees into wiring funds, to posing as relatives in distress.
In automated fraud scams, bots can operate fake websites, chatrooms, and social media profiles 24/7, targeting thousands of victims globally. In synthetic identity fraud, criminals can use software to generate thousands of fake but convincing identities that can apply for loans, credit cards, or benefits simultaneously.
The arithmetic is stark. In most Western jurisdictions - like Australia, the possible criminal sanction is light, asset recovery problematic, and profits enormous - so the risk-reward calculation will continue to favour those engaged in organised crime.
- Professor Clive Williams is director of The Terrorism Research Centre.
